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WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE VII, SECTION 7,
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION
ALBERT COATES* AND WILLIAM S. MITCHELL "*
"No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation," says Article
VII, Section 7, of the North Carolina Constitution, "shall contract any
debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or
collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses
thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein."
In 1876, eight years after this provision was adopted, the city of
Charlotte undertook to issue bonds for admittedly necessary expenses,
without a vote of the people. In the case of Wilson v. Charlotte,' it
was argued that this could not be done because Article VII, Section 7,
consisted of two separate restrictions, one on the power to incur debt,
and the other on the power to levy taxes; that the limitation at the end
applied to both restrictions; and that, while taxes for necessary expenses
might be levied without a vote of the people, no debt of any sort could
be incurred without a vote of the people. "The benefits to be derived
and the evils to be avoided by a cash administration of government are
too obvious for further comment." 2 Not so, said the majority opinion.
"The effect of such reading would be to prohibit every municipal cor-
poration from contracting any debt, absolutely and without qualification.
and to make every debt contracted for whatever purpose, and under all
circumstances, illegal and void. Such a prohibition would be unreason-
able. The duties of a county or city government cannot be performed
without often contracting debts. Officers and servants of divers duties
must be engaged, payable at some fixed interval---daily, monthly, or
quarterly, as the case may be. The contract for employment creates a
debt as soon as the service has been performed. It must necessarily
remain a debt for some space of time, however short; and if the debt
be thus made illegal, the corporation cannot lawfully pay, and the credi-
tor cannot recover it. So of contracts to execute a certain work. For
example, to build a bridge. An absolute prohibition to contract a debt
*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Director, Institute of
Government.
** Member, Student Board of Editors, NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIFW: Mem-
ber of Staff, Institute of Government.
74 N. C. 748 (1876). The city of Charlotte levied a tax of 4 of 1%/o on the
property valuation to be used to pay the interest and principal on bonds issued to
make up deficiencies incurred for widening the city streets, and other necessary
city purposes.
'Id. at 765 (dissent of Bynum, J.).
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is a prohibition to contract at all, for every contract may and naturally
does end in debt. We cannot suppose that the Constitution intended
to deprive these great and necessary public corporations of a power
which is usual to all corporations, which these have possessed, and which
is necessary to their usefulness, if not to their very existence, except
upon language which admits of no other meaning.' 3 From that day to
this it has been held that local units of government may incur debts, as
well as levy taxes, for necessary expenses without a vote of the people.
The dissenting judge took one parting shot at the court's conclusion.
"Such a construction only avoids one evil by flying to another. There
is only one way of escape, and that is by applying the plain prohibition
against the contraction of any debt, for any purpose, except in the way
prescribed, to-wit, by popular vote.
"According to the construction put upon it by the Court, Art. VII,
sec. 7, had as well be struck from the Constitution; as I am of opinion
that practically it is thereby made inoperative." 4 How much of poetry
and how much of truth was wrapped up in these observations, the sub-
sequent history of this section will reveal.
From 1868 to 1940 the Supreme Court of North Carolina has con-
strued "necessary expenses" with alternating strictness and liberality
in the effort to keep in the middle of the road. It has successively classi-
fied the following as necessary expenses within the meaning of Article
VII, Section 7: (1) the ordinary expenses of government,5 including
salaries and wages and office expense (decisions specifically mention
salaries of mayor, treasurer, city attorney, janitor,0 county commis-
sioners' pay, county attorney, sheriff's salary and expense of sheriff's
office, register of deeds' salary and expense of office, clerk superior
court's salary and expense of office, county accountant's salary,7 police,8
Id. at 758. 'Id. at 765 (dissent of Bynum, J.).
'Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 267 (1876), where bonds issued by the city of
Raleigh to make up a deficiency incurred for "ordinary city purposes, as work on
streets, wvells, cemeteries, etc., and Ito pay the police", were held to be for necessary
municipal expenses. In Long v. Commissioners, 76 N. C. 273 (1877) sclmble,
where the county commissioners levied a tax of 16 2/3 cents on the $100 property
valuation for "ordinary county expenses", the court said repairing the county build-
ings, "necessary highwa3 moneys", erecting bridges, maintenance and well ordering
of the poor, feeding .prisoners, paying jurors-all are of the class of necessary
expenses.
'Gardner v. New Berne, 98 N. C. 228, 3 S. E. 500 (1887) semble.
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E.
603 (1938), in which taxes levied for (1) county commissioners' pay, expense,
and board, county court house and grounds, and county attorney's fees; (2) tax
listing expense; (3) expense of holding elections; (4) sheriff's salary and ex-
pense of office; (5) register of deeds' salary and expense af office; (6) clerk
superior court's salary and expense of office; (7) county accountant's salary;
(8) county farm agent's salary; (9) upkeep county buildings, courthouse, county
home, poor and paupers; and (10) holding courts, expense of jail and jail prisoners
were held to be for necessary expenses.
' Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 267 (1876), cited supra note 5.
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jurors' fees, feeding and care of prisoners,9 tax listing expense, ex-
pense of holding elections, 10 etc.) ; (2) the building and repair of mu-
nicipal buildings such as city halls," county courthouses, 12 guardhouses
and jails,' 3 fire alarm systems, 14 fire stations and sites therefor,15 police
station,' 0 office rent for suitable headquarters, 17 etc.; (3) the building
'Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603
(1938), cited supra note 7; Long v. Commissioners, 76 N. C. 273 (1877) semble,
cited supra note 5; see Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C. 420, 422, 29 S. E. 368, 369(1898).
" Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603
(1938), cited sitpra note 7.
" Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N. C. 569, 65 S. E. 279 (1909), in which $125,000
of city bonds issued by Raleigh, under special legislative authority without a vote
of the people, for the purpose of erecting a municipal building to be used as a
police station, city hall, and for other municipal purposes, were held to be for
necessary municipal expenses; Kinston v. Security Trust Co., 169 N. C. 207,
85 S. E. 399 (1915), in which $100,000 of city bonds issued to provide funds
with which to pave and improve city streets, enlarge and improve the electric
light plant, enlarge the water-works system, install an electric fire alarm system,
and to erect municipal buildings, were held to be for necessary municipal expenses.
2 Long v. Commissioners, 76 N. C. 273 (1877), in which a 10 cent tax on $100
property valuation levied by the county commissioners to provide funds with which
to repair the county courthouse was held to be for a necessary expense; Halcombe
v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 346 (1883), in which a special county tax levied, under
special legislative authority, without a vote of the qualified voters for the pur-
pose of building a county courthouse, was held to be for a necessary expense;
Vaughn v. Commissioners, 117 N. C. 429, 23 S. E. 354 (1895), in which the
county commissioners issued county notes to provide funds with which to build
a county courthouse. The court said: "It is absolutely essential to the adminis-
tration of justice that a suitable court-house and jail should be built at every
county site in the State." Id. at 434, 23 S. E. at 355. Black v. Commissioners,
129 N. C. 121. 39 S. E. 818 (1901), in which county bonds were issued to pro-
vide funds with which to build a county courthouse; Burgin v. Smith, 151 N. C.
561, 66 S. E. 607 (1909) ; Jackson v. Commissioners, 171 N. C. 379, 88 S. E.
521 (1916), in which the county commissioners sought to issue $80,000 of
bonds to provide funds to construct a courthouse and a "new and sufficiently
capacious jail, with sufficient and modern conveniences, light, heat, water, and
sewerage", and, also. "a house suitable for the jailer, on the same lot";
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603
(1938), cited supra note 7.
" Haskett v. Tyrrell County, 152 N. C. 714, 68 S. E. 202 (1910), in which
$6,500 county -bonds were issued to provide funds with which to build a county jail;
Jackson v. Commissioners, 171 N. C. 379, 88 S. E. 521 (1916), cited supra note 12;
Castevens v. Stanly County, 209 N. C. 75, 183 S. E. 3 (1935) ; Nantahala Power
& Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603 (1938), cited supra
note 7. Cromartie v. Commissioners, 87 N. C. 134 (1882) semble, in which a
county tax of 34 1/3 cents on the $100 property valuation was levied to be used to
repair the county jail, the county courthouse, bridges and for other necessary county
expenses; see Vaughn v. Commissioners, 117 N. C. 429, 434, 23 S. E. 354, 355
(1895) ; Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 5, 15. 29 S. E. 343, 346 (1898).
"'Kinston v. Security Trust Co., 169 N. C. 207, 85 S. E. 399 (1915), cited
supra. note 11.
" Briggs v. Raleigh, 166 N. C. 149, 81 S. E. 1084 (1914), in which the city
issued $100,000 in bonds for the purposes of extending the sewer line, purchasing
a site and building a fire house thereon, and for building permanent pavements.
The court said: "It must be admitted that the purposes for which the bonds
were issued are all municipal necessary expenses ... " Id. at 151, 81 S. E.
at 1085.
"Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N. C. 569, 65 S. E. 279 (1909), cited supra
note 11.17Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603
(1938), cited mspra note 7; Mitchell v. Trustees of Township No. 8, 71 N. C.
400 (1874).
1940]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and repair of public roads,' 8 streets, 19 and bridges ;20 (4) the building
1 Hirring v. Dixon, 122 N. C. 420, 29 S. E. 368 (1898), in which a special
county tax was levied, under special legislative authority, without a vote of the
people, for the purpose of "laying out, discontinuing, establishing, building, con-
structing, and repairing public roads and public bridges" in the county; Tate
v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 812, 30 S. E. 352 (1898), in which the county tax
was applied not only to the construction and maintenance of roads, but also to
the purchase of such implements, teams, wagons, camp outfit and stockade for
the use and safekeeping of convict labor "as may be found necessary in thle
proper carrying on of the road construction"; Highway Comm. v. C. A. Webb &
Co., 152 N. C. 710, 68 S. E. 211 (1910), in which constructing, improving, and
macadamizing the public roads was held to be a necessary expense of a township;
Commissioners v. Road Commissioners, 165 N. C. 632, 81 S. E. 1001 (1914) ; Har-
grave v. Commissioners, 168 N. C. 626, 84 S. E. 1044 (1915) ; Woodall v. Highway
Comm., 176 N. C. 377, 97 S. E. 226, (1918), in which the construction and mainte-
nance of roads is held to be a necessary expense of a special highway district;
Ellis v. Greene, 191 N. C. 761, 133 S. E. 395 (1926) ; Thomson v. Harnett
County, 209 N. C. 662, 184 S. E. 490 (1936), in which $427,000 of county bonds
bearing a 4% interest rate were issued to refinance a like amount of township
road bonds bearing a 6% interest rate, under a plan whereby the county was to
assume all liability for the various township road bonds, some of which were in
default, by issuing county bonds therefor, was to hold the township bonds in a
sinking fund, and was to pay the county bonds by a tax equal to 6% of the bonds
issued by each township to be levied in the respective townships. See Brodnax
v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244, 249 (1870).
"9 Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748 (1876), cited supra note 1, in which the
court held that constructing and repairing city streets is within the class of neces-
sary expenses, and that widening the streets must come under the same class;
Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 267 (1876) (work on city streets) ; Young v. Hender-
son, 76 N. C. 420 (1877); Greensboro v. Scott, 138 N. C. 181, 50 S. E. 589
(1905) (grading and paving the city streets); Hendersonville v. Jordan, 150
N. C. 35, 63 S. E. 167 (1908); Kinston v. Security Trust Co., 169 N. C. 207,
85 S. E. 399 (1915) ;' Brown v. Hillsboro, 185 N. C. 368, 117 S. E: 41 (1923) ;
Starmount Co. v. Hamilton Lakes, 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E. 909 (1933), in
which the court held that since the construction and improvement of streets, and
the construction and maintenance of water-works and sewerage systems are
within the class of necessary expenses, it is within the discretion of the to3vn
commissioners as to whether 22 miles of street grading, 3 miles of street paving,
7Y2 miles of sewer main, and 81 miles of water main, costing not less than$200,000 in the aggregate, was a necessary expense of a municipal corporation
covering an area of only about 14,000 square acres, and having a population of
not over fifteen families.
Commissioners v. C. A. Webb & Co., 148 N. C. 120, 61 S. E. 670 (1908), in
which $18,000 in city bonds issued for the purpose of building, repairing, and pav-
ing city sidewalks were held to be for' necessary expenses of the city; Storm v.
Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C. 679, 128 S. E. 17 (1925), in which city bonds issued
for the purpose of constructing public boardwalks on the streets and other public
places of the town, were held to be for necessary municipal expenses.
"0 Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244 (1870), in which the county commissioners
levied a special tax under special legislative authority for the purpose of building
and repairing public bridges in the county: Satterthwaite v. Commissioners, 76
N. C. 153 (1877), in which county bonds were issued to purchase an existing
toll-bridge across the Pamlico river for the purpose of establishing a free-bridge
for the use of the public; Evans v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 154 (1883) ; Herring
v. Dixon, 122 N. C. 420. 29 S. E. 368 (1898), cited supra note 18; Warsaw v.
Malone, 159 N. C. 573, 75 S. E. 1011 (1912), in which the town of War'saw issued
bonds for the purpose of building and maintaining bridges therein; Martin County
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 178 N. C. 26, 100 S. E. 134 (1919), in which
$150,000 of county bonds to be used in building a bridge, and a road approaching
same, were held to be for a necessary county expense, even though part of the
bridge and road extended into the adjoining county; Emery v. Commissioners.
181 N. C. 420. 107 S. E. 443 (1921), in which $80,000 of county bonds to be used
iri building a bridge and approaches thereto were held to be for a necessary ex-
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and repair of market houses ;21 (5) the building and repair of county
homes22 and the maintenance of the poor;23 (6) furnishing adequate
water supply, including the digging of wells, 24 contracting for water
supply, building of water-works plants; (7) the building of sewerage
systems ;25 (8) the building of electric light plants ;2e (9) performing
autopsy,2 7 maintenance of the public peace, and other phases of the
administration of justice ;28 (10) fire insurance for school buildings ;29
pense, even though part of the bridge and approaches thereto extended across the
line into another state.
Williams v. Commissioners, 119 N. C. 520, 26 S. E. 150 (1896) semble (main-
taining free public ferries in the county).
21 Smith v. New Bern, 70 N. C. 14 (1874) (construction of a market-house
in and for the use of the city of New Bern); Wade v. Newbern, 77 N. C. 460
(1877), in which the city councilmen entered a contract to lease a warehouse
for ten years, to be used as a market-house until a new one could be built;
Swinson v. Mount Olive, 147 N. C. 611, 61 S. E. 569 (1908), in which the town
issued $6,000 in bonds, with a vote of the people, for the purpose of building a
market-house; Le Roy v. Elizabeth City, 166 N. C. 93, 81 S. E. 1072 (1914), in
which expenditures for building a market-house and an esplanade adjacent thereto,
and the reasonable expenses incurred in issuing the bonds to finance same are
held to be necessary expenses.
" Commissioners v. Sidney Spitzer & Co., 173 N. C. 147, 91 S. E. 707 (1917),
in which the county commissioners issued bonds for the purpose of securing site
for and building a county home; Norfolk Southern R. R. v. Reid, 187 N. C. 320,
121 S. E. 534 (1924) ; Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C.
698, 197 S. E. 603 (1938) (maintenance of county home).
" Jones v. Commissioners, 137 N. C. 579, 50 S. E. 291 (1905) ; Keith v. Lock-
hart, 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640 (1916) (support of the aged and infirm) ; Com-
missioners v. Sidney Spitzer & Co., 173 N. C. 147, 91 S. E. 707 (1917) ; Nantahala
Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603 (1938) (poor and
paupers).
2" Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 267 (1876) (cleaning out -wells) ; see Smith v.
New Bern, 70 N. C. 14, 19 (1874) (artesian well).
"
5 Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903), in which
the court held that a debt incurred by a city or town for the purpose of building
and operating plants, and constructing a water-works system, to supply water
and electric lights for municipal use, and to sell to its inhabitants, was for a
necessary municipal expense; Greensboro v. Scott, 138 N. C. 181, 50 S. E. 589
(1905), in which $250,000 of city bonds were issued for the purpose of building
and enlarging a water-works plant, building and maintaining a sewerage system
and paving and improving city streets; Bradshaw v. High Point, 151 N. C.
517, 66 S. E. 601 (1909); Underwood v. Asheboro, 152 N. C. 641, 68 S. E.
147 (1910) ; Murphy v. C. A. Webb & Co., 156 N. C. 402, 72 S. E. 460 (1911) ;
Kinston v. Security Trust Co., 169 N. C. 207, 85 S. E. 399 (1915) ; Swindell v.
Belhaven, 173 N. C. 1, 91 S. E. 369 (1917) ; Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N.
C. 679, 128 S. E. 17 (1925); Starmount Co. v. Hamilton Lakes, 209, N. C. 514,
171 S. E. 909 (1933), cited supra note 19; Burt v. Biscoe, 209 N. C. 70, 183 S. E.
1 (1935).
" Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903), cited mspra
note 25; Davis v. Fremont, 135 N. C. 538, 47 S. E. 671 (1904) ; Ellison v. William-
ston, 152 N. C. 147, 67 S. E. 255 (1910); Kinston v. Security Trust Co., 169
N. C. 207, 85 S. E. 399 (1915) (enlarge and better equip the electric light plant) ;
Swindell v. Belhaven, 173 N. C. 1, 91 S. E. 369 (1917) (system of electric
lights); Williamson v. High Point, 213 N. C. 96, 195 S. E. 90 (1938).
"Withers v. Commissioners, 163 N. C. 341, 79 S. E. 615 (1913), in which an
autopsy made of a deceased's stomach, upon the order of the trial judge, in a
criminal proceeding, was held to be a necessary county expense.
28 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E.
603 (1938), cited supra note 7; see Garsed v. Greensboro, 126 N. C. 159, 162,
35 S. E. 254, 255 (1900) (reasonable expense incurred in regulating the sale of
liquor by others as a necessary county and municipal expense); Jones v. Corn-
19401
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(11) incinerators;30 (12) parks and playgrounds; 31 (13) professional
services in refunding bonds;32 (14) contract with hospital for care of
indigent sick and afflicted poor- 3 (15) jetties;8 4 (16) abattoir;8 5
(17) county farm agent's salary;38 and (18) cemeteries. By way of
dictum 88 the court has classified the following as necessary expenses:
(19) hay scales and (20) town clock.
The court has classified the following as non-necessary expenses
within the meaning of Article VII, Section 7: (1) liquor dispensary;89
(2) county stock fence;40 (3) chamber of commerce;41 (4) wharves
and docks;42 (5) cotton platform;43 (6) county and city hospital;44
missioners, 137 N. C. 579, 598, 50 S. E. 291, 298 (1905) (the maintenance of the
public peace, and the administration of public justice is included in the term
"necessary expense").
"Fuller v. Lockhart, 209 N. C. 61, 182 S. E. 733 (1935).
o Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C. 679, 128 S. E. 17 (1925), in which
city bonds were issued for the purpose of constructing an incinerator for the
destruction of garbage in the town.
31 In Atkins v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936), where the
city of Durham issued $25,000 in bonds without a vote of the qualified voters, for
the purpose of acquiring lands for public parks and playgrounds, including build-
ings thereon, and improving and developing same, and furnishing them with
equipment and apparatus, the court held that for a city as populous and industrial
as Durham, public .parks and playgrounds were necessary expenses. C1. Twining
v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939), in which it was held that
bonds for the purpose of acquiring bonds and establishing public parks and play-
grounds, and equipping same, are not for a necessary expense of the city of
Wilmington.
" Morrow v. Commissioners, 210 N. C. 564, 187 S. E. 752 (1936).
" Martin v. Commissioners, 208 N. C. 354, 180 S. E. 777 (1935), in which
Wake County, under special legislative authority, without a vote of the qualified
voters, contracted to pay an annual rental up to $10,000, and to levy a special
tax therefor, to Rex Hospital, for the medical treatment and hospital care of the
indigent sick and afflicted poor in that city.
"' Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C. 679, 128 S. E. 17 (1925), in which
city bonds were issued for the purpose of constructing jetties along the beach to
keep back the ocean and to build up the town.
-Moore v. Greensboro, 191 N. C. 592, 132 S. E. 565 (1926), in which bopds
were issued, and a special tax levied, for the purpose of buying a site and erecting
and equipping a city abattoir for the slaughter and inspection of cattle and beef.3 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E.
603 (1938), cited supra note 7.
:, Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 267 (1876), cited supra note 5.3
'Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 127, 45 S. E. 1029, 1030 (1903).
" Garsed v. Greensboro, 126 N. C. 159, 35 S. E. 254 (1900), in which the city
of Greensboro attempted to loan money to the State Dispensary Board for the
purpose of establishing a dispensary in the city for regulation and sale of liquors.
40 Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640 (1916), in 'which a county
sought to borrow money for the purpose of building a line fence around the county
in order to maintain a free range cattle law therein; Archer v. Joyner, 173 N. C.
75, 91 S. E. 699 (1917).
" Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N. C. 392, 119 S. E. 767 (1923), in which the
city council, under special legislative authority, sought to set aside the funds from
a tax of from 1/30 to 1/10 of 1% on property, to be spent by the chamber of
commerce of High Point, under its control and direction, for the purpose of aiding
and encouraging the location of manufacturing, industrial, and commercial plants
in and near the city, etc.
" Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 5. E. 25 (1926).
" Walker v. Faison, 202 N. C. 694, 163 S. E. 875 (1932), in which the town
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(7) municipal airport;45 (8) city auditorium;4e (9) schools;47 (10)
public library ;48 (11) land and buildings for athletic and recreational
purposes;49 (12) railroads;50 and (13) "fire drill tower".5 1 By way
of dictum,52 the court has classified an electric street car line as a non-
necessary expense.
Since 1868, the court has reversed itself twice, transferring water-
works and electric lights from the non-necessary to the necessary ex-
pense grouping.53 While it has never reversed its ruling that schools
constructed a municipal platform for the convenience of farmers and cotton
buyers in loading, unloading, and selling cotton and truck.
" Armstrong v. Commissioners, 185 N. C. 405, 117 S. E. 388 (1923). in which
the county proposed to issue $150,000 in bonds, and levy a special tax, for the
purpose of constructing and maintaining a tuberculosis hospital in the county;
Burleson v. Board of Aldermen, 200 N. C. 30, 156 S. E. 241 (1930), in which
the town aldermen proposed to issue $35,000 in bonds, and levy a special tax for
the payment of same, for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating
a public hospital in the town; Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C. 284, 193
S. E. 668 (1937), in which the county commissioners proposed to issue $30,000
in bonds, and to levy a special tax to pay same, for the purpose of constructing
an annex to the county hospital, to be used principally for the care of the indigent
sick and afflicted poor of the county; Sessions v. Columbus County, 214 N. C.
634, 200 S. E. 418 (1939).
Nash v. Monroe, 198 N. C. 306, 151 S. E. 634 (1930), in which the city alder-
men proposed to borrow $5,000 with which to buy supplies and medical equipment
for the city hospital, and the court held that the maintenance of a municipal
hospital is not a necessary governmental expense.
, Goswick v. Durham, 211 N. C. 687, 191 S. E. 728 (1937) ; Sing v. Charlotte,
213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271 (1938), in which the city council proposed to spend
$5,000, raised by taxation for a contingency and emergency fund, for the purpose
of operating, maintaining, and further equipping the municipal airport.
Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939).
Trustees of Goldsboro Graded School v. Broadhurst, 109 N. C. 228, 13
S. E. 781 (1891) ; Rodman v. Washington, 122 N. C. 39, 30 S. E. 118 (1898) ;
Bear v. Commissioners, 124 N. C. 204, 32 S. E. 558 (1899); Smith v. School
Trustees, 141 N. C. 143, 53 S. E. 524 (1906); cf. Collie v. Commissioners, 145
N. C. 170, 59 S. E. 44 (1907).
Wharton v. Greensboro, 146 N. C. 356, 59 S. E. 1043 (1907) ; Hollowell v.
Borden, 148 N. C. 255, 61 S. E. 638 (1908) ; Perry v. Commissioners, 148 N. C.
521, 62 S. E. 608 (1908); Ellis v. Trustees of the Graded School of Oxford,
156 N. C. 10, 72 S. E. 2 (1911) ; Stephens Co. v. Charlotte, 172 N. C. 564, 90 S. E.
588 (1916); Williams v. Commissioners, 176 N. C. 554, 97 S. E. 478 (1918);
Hill v. Lenoir County, 176 N. C. 572, 97 S. E. 498 (1918) ; Frazier v. Commis-
sioners, 194 N. C. 49, 138 S. E. 433 (1927) ; Hall v. Commissioners, 194 N. C.
768, 140 S. E. 739 (1927); Greensboro v. Guilford County, 209 N. C. 655, 184
S. E. 473 (1936).
"Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939), in which the
city proposed to issue bonds for the purpose of erecting and equipping a municipal
building to be used in part as a public library; Westbrook v. Southern Pines, 215
N. C. 20, 1 S. E. (2d) 95 (1939), in which the city pledged its faith and credit
to procure a grant from the Public Works Administration of the Federhl Govern-
ment to be used in the erection of a public library building.
" Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939).
" Chester & Lenoir Narrow Gauge R. R. v. Commissioners, 72 N. C. 486
(1875); Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C. 227, 2 S. E. 653 (1887); Lynchburg &
Durham R. R. v. Commissioners, 109 N. C. 159, 13 S. E. 783 (1891) ; Commis-
sioners v. Payne, 123 N. C. 432, 31 S. E. 711 (1898).
" Wilson'v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 856, 175 S. E. 306 (1934).
" See Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 5, 15, 29 S. E. 343, 346 (1898).
" In the case of Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903),
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are not a necessary expense, it has reached a substantial equivalent
through a belated construction of Article IX of the constitution.54
However, it has never withdrawn a function from the necessary ex-
pense grouping once the favored classification has been granted.55
DIVIDING LINE
"It vould be difficult or impossible to draw a precise line between
what are and what are not the necessary expenses of the government
of a city", said the court in Wilson v. Charlotte;0 and court decisions
from that day to this have demonstrated the truth of this observation.
It has been repeated until it has become a refrain in later cases. It
broke into an almost despairing cry in Henderson v. Wihnington.57
"In defining 'necessary expense' we derive practically no aid from the
cases 'decided in other States.... We must rely on our own decisions."
And the fervor of this cry has constantly increased. But when we
turn to "our own decisions", what do we find? "There are some things
clearly within the line" of necessary expenses, said the court in Mayo
v. Commissioners,58 such as courthouses, jails, public highways, public
bridges. "There are others that are clearly outside the line of necessary
expenses, such as appropriations to build railroads, cotton factories, to
build and operate electric street car lines, etc." However, said the court,
"The erection of electric light plants and water works plants may not
be so far outside the line of power as some of the things mentioned.
But we are of the 'decided opinion that they are outside. . . . The
claim of power upon the plea of necessity must stop somewhere." 5 9
holding the building and operation of plants and water-works systems for the
purpose of supplying water and lights to the city and its inhabitants, the court
overruled the following cases: Charlotte v. Shepard, 120 N. C. 411, 27 S. E.
109 (1897), in which the city council proposed to levy a special tax to pay the
interest and principal on bonds issued for' the purpose of establishing a water-
works system in the city; Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 5, 29 S. E. 343(1898), in which the city commissioners proposed to issue $20,000 in bonds for
the purpose of buying and operating an electric light plant to light the public
streets and public buildings of the town; Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N. C. 31,
30 S. E. 349 (1898) (thirty-year contract to supply city with water); Edgerton
v. Goldsboro Water Co., 126 N. C. 93, 35 S. E. 243 (1900) (one-year contract
to supply city with water).
" Collie v. Commissioners, 145 N. C. 170, 59 S. E. 44 (1907) ; Lacy v. Fidelity
Bank of Durham, 183 N. C. 373, 111 S. E. 612 (1922) ; Frazier v. Commissioners,
194 N. C. 49, 138 S. E. 433 (1927); Hall v. Commissioners, 194 N. C. 768, 140
S. E. 739 (1927).
" In Hargrave v. Commissioners, 168 N. C. 626, 631, 84 S. E. 1044, 1047
(1915), however, one of the justices, in a dissenting opinion, came to the con-
clusion that public roads should be taken from the category of necessary expense,
his chief'reason being that the framers of the constitution in 1868 did not foresee
and did not intend that a debt of $300,000, or other unlimited amount, could be
fastened upon the taxpayers of a county, without their consent.
r°74 N. C. 748, 759 (1876).
57 191 N. C. 269, 277, 132 S. E. 25, 29 (1926).





The court has indicated many tests and standards to guide itself
and others in drawing this admittedly difficult line. When the court
starts with the assumption that building roads is a necessary expense,
it is easy to extend the assumption to include the building of streets,
the widening of streets, the building of sidewalks and driveways, the
building of bridges as links in streets and highways, and perhaps, the
building of ferries as connecting links in a highway system; but, the
logic stops at the seashore and leaves wharves and docks as connecting
links between land and sea transportation outside the family of neces-
sary expenses. Likewise, the court reasons that if the building of roads,
streets, and -bridges are necessary expenses, it can extend the analogy to
include the grading, paving, repairing, and purchase thereof, and the
purchase of teams, wagons, camp outfits, and other road building acces-
sories, including a stockade for prisoners. If providing a city water
supply is a necessary expense, the court has little -difficulty in extending
the notion from digging and cleaning out wells, to contracting for a
supply of water, and to the building of its own water-works system.
If the lighting of streets is a necessary expense, the city may replace
the hand lighting of kerosene lamps on lamp posts with its own electric
lighting system.60 Thus, new items are added to the list, and by logical
extension from a given starting point, the concept of necessary expenses
is expanded.
"The analogy of the law of necessaries for infants is the only one
that occurs to us", said the court in one of the earlier cases.6 1 "It is
held that if, considering the means and station in life of the infant, the
article sold to him may be necessaries under any circumstances, they
come within a class for which the infant may be liable, and upon his
refusal to pay, it is for a jury to determine whether under the actual
circumstances they were necessary. If, however, the articles are merely
ornamental, and such as cannot, under any circumstances, be necessary
to one of the means and station of the infant, a court may, as matter
of law, declare that the infant is not liable. We do not undertake to
say that this analogy will furnish a rule which will admit of a close
application. But if treated merely as an analogy, in the absence of other
"In Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 129, 45 S. E. 1029, 1031 (1903),
the court, after holding that lighting the streets of the town was a necessary
expense, said: "It is well settled that the discretion of municipal corporations
within the sphere of their powers is not subject to judicial control. . . . We can
see no good reason why they may not also, without statutory authority, provide
and maintain the necessary plant to generate and supply the electricity required.
Possessing authority to do the lighting, that power carries with it incidentally
the further power to procure or furnish whatever is necessary for the production
and dissemination of the light."
"Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748, 759 (1876).
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guides, it may be of some general use." With the help of this analogy,
the court concludes that widening streets is a necessary expense to an
infant of the means and station in life of the city of Charlotte. This
test was repeated in a later case,6 2 but apparently was discarded there-
after on the theory of its originator that it "did not admit of a close
application".
Another test is whether the expenditure is necessary to the existence
of the local unit of government. Does this mean what will barely sus-
tain a unit's life? What will keep the unit from falling back? What
will help it grow? What will add to its comfort and convenience?
Certainly the court has not limited the class of necessary expenses to
those things essential to a bare living. "And it seems to us that it may
be reasonably considered as certain," said the court in Fawcett v. Mount
Airy;63 "that the words 'necessary expense' do not mean expenses in-
curred or to be incurred for purposes or objects that are only for the
procurement or maintenance of things absolutely essential to the exist-
ence of the municipality." And the court proceeds to prove its point
from previous decisions: "The expenditure of money for the widening
of streets, the erection of market houses, town clocks, and hay scales
are all considered as necessary expenses, and those things are not es-
sential to the life of the municipality." On the other hand, everything
that will be useful and helpful to a unit's growth will not be consid-
ered a necessary expense. For in Henderson v. Wilmington,6 4 the court,
in holding that wharves and docks, admittedly helpful and even neces-
sary to Wilmington's growth as a seaport city, were not a "necessary
expense", said: "With the mere utility of the enterprise we are not
concerned. Whether 'shipping, foreign and coastwise' would expand
commerce is alien to the principle we are considering. The convenience,
the benefit to be conferred upon a particular class, the insufficiency of
present facilities, and a want of opportunity for commercial or indus-
trial competition-these and similar premises are not factors that can
control or even contribute to our solution of the present controversy."
Somewhere between the "subsistence line" and the "utility line", the
"necessary expense line" must be drawn.
Another suggested test is whether the expenditure is one of the
"ordinary expenses" of the local unit. Does this mean expenses that
were customary at the time the constitution was adopted in 1868? Or
customary at the time the question is called to the attention of the
court? Certainly not the former, because examination of statutes prior
to 1868 reveals many customary expenses of local units never yet con-
:2 Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903).03 Id. at 127, 45 S. E. at 1030.
-, 191 N. C. 269, 276, 132 S. E. 25, 29 (1926).
[Vol. 18
"NECESSARY EXPENSES"
sidered as necessary expenses.65 Certainly not the latter, because ex-
amination of present statutes reveals many customary expenses of local
units expressly held not to be necessary expenses.66 Nor does it mean
expenses which have become customary expenses in a particular unit
by long repeated expenditures, for this would permit a unit to create
its own necessities by the force of habit. Apparently the court means
the term "ordinary expenses" to be related in some degree to a unit's
necessities for "existence plus". If so, this test leaves us where we
started.
"The necessary expenses of a county," said the dissenting justice
in Barksdale v. Commissioners,67 "must be such as are incident to the
execution of the purposes for which it is created, and -with which it is
charged from time to time by the legislature." This was carried forward
by a dissenting justice in Edgerton v. Water Company:6 8 ". . . When
the Legislature of the State has required the town to procure water, to
the above extent at least, it is a necessary purpose." It was repeated
in the majority opinion in Wadsworth v. Concord:69 "We are of the
opinion that when it is made the diuty of the commissioners to provide
lights it is at least a legislative construction of the Constitution that it is
a necessary expense." This doctrine appeared in stronger terms in
Commissioners v. Spitzer,7 0 where the court pointed out the constitu-
tional observation that "'Beneficent provision for the poor, the unfor-
tunate, and orphan' is 'one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian
State'," and held that a county home was a necessary expense.71 But
this doctrine proves too much. Local units derive their powers and.
duties from the legislature.72 Among those duties, the constitution
61 Aid to railroads, subscriptions to railroad stock, canals, and other internal
improvements, etc.
00 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939), §2796 (municipal lospitals) ; id. §1297
(29) (county hospitals) ; id. §1334(8) (a) (school houses); id. §1334(8) (g)
(public auditorium) ; id. §1334(8) (m) (airports and landing fields).
07 93 N. C. 472, 485 (1885).
08 126 N. C. 93, 99, 35 S. E. 243, 244 (1900).
OD 133 N. C. 587, 592, 45 S. E. 948, 949 (1903).
7o 173 N. C. 147, 91 S. E. 707 (1917).
"In Henderson v. Wilmington,- 191 N. C. 269, 283, 132 S. E. 25, 33 (1926),
a dissenting justice said: "The Legislature has recognized the necessity of certain
things that municipalities can acquire and among them wharves (terminal facili-
ties). The will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, subject to the
Constitution. To say the least, the fact that the Legislature having given the
municipalities the power in its discretion to acquire by .purchase or condemnation
and management and control of wharves, is a legislative construction that wharves
are a necessity. This declaration should have great persuasive influence on a
court."
72 Murphy v. C. A. Webb & Co., 156 N. C. 402, 406, 72 S. E. 460, 461 (1911);
the court said: "While in respect to cities and towns it is said that the power of the
Legislature to control them, in the exercise of their municipal powers, is somewhat
more restricted than in the case of counties, yet both are but instrumentalities
of the State, for the administration of local government, and their authority as
such may be enlarged, abridged, or withdrawn entirely at the will or pleasure
of the Legislature."
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itself distinguishes between necessary and non-necessary expenses."
The books are full of duties imposed on local units by the legislature
which the courts have held not to be necessary expenses,1 4 nor even a
public purpose for which public money may be spent.75
Time and again judges have called the roll of governmental func-
tions which have been held to be necessary expenses, and, by a process
of induction, have concluded that another function is just as important
and ought to be included in the list: as in Mayo v. Comnissioners,71
where a dissenting justice said that since the court has held that a
guardhouse, a fire engine and an artesian well were necessary expenses,
it ought to hold electric light plants to be a necessary expense; as in
Henderson v. Wilmington,7 7 where a dissenting justice argued that
since the court had held electric light plants, water-works systems, sewer-
age facilities, roads, bridges, jetties, fire departments, guardhouses,
market houses, courthouses, etc., to be necessary expenses, it ought to
hold wharves and docks to be a necessary expense; as in Palmer v.
Haywood Colinty,78 where a dissenting justice, after calling an even
longer roll, reproaches the court with the fact that under its decisions
". .. it is lawful to incur an expense in building jetties in the sea to
protect the property of summer cottagers on the seashore, but prohibits
the construction of a hospital intended primarily to minister to the in-
digent sick ant the afflicted poor-playgrounds and public parks to
preserve the health of the well-to-do are necessary, while a hospital with
its attendant nursing facilities, to restore health to those who are sick,
is not."
From time to time the court has tried to reduce the term "necessary
expense" to a formula. In Fawcett v. Mount Airy,70 it says: "The
words 'necessary expense', then, must mean such expenses as are or
may be incurred in the establishing and procuring of those things with-
out which the peace and order of the community, its moral interests
and the protection of its property and that of the property and persons
"' "No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any
debt . . . except for the necessary expenses thereof ... " N. C. CONsT. art.
VII, §7.
"'Lynchburg & Durham R. R. v. Commissioners, 109 N. C. 159, 13 S. E. 783
(1887) (railroads); Hollowell v. Borden, 148 N. C. 255, 61 S. E. 638 (1908)
(schools); Keith v. Lockhart, 173 N. C. 452, 92 S. E. 270 (1916) (county stock
fence) ; Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 S. E. 25 (1926) (wharves
and docks); Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C. 284, 193 S. E. 668 (1937)
(public hospital) ; Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271 (1938) (municipal
airports).Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N. C. 392, 119 S. E. 767 (1923) (donation of
public money, etc., to encourage business and industrial enterprises to locate
therein).78 122 N. C. 5, 30, 29 S. E. 343, 351 (1898).
7 191 N. C. 269, 281, 132 S. E. 25, 32 (1926).
78212 N. C. 284, 293, 193 S. E. 668, 674 (1937).
7- 134 N. C. 125, 127, 45 S. E. 1029, 1030 (1903).
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of its inhabitants would seriously suffer considerable damage, leaving
out of view the matter of the great inconvenience that would be at-
tendant upon our present social life for want of such expenditures."
And, again in Henderson v. Wilmington:80 "The decisions heretofore
rendered by the Court make the test of a 'necessary expense' the pur-
pose for which the expense is to be incurred. If the purpose is the
maintenance of the public peace or the administration of justice; if it
partakes of a governmental nature or purports to lie an exercise by
the city of a portion of the State's delegated sovereignty; if, in brief,
it involves a necessary governmental expense-in these cases" the ex-
pense required to effect the purpose is 'necessary' within the meaning
of Art. VII, sec. 7. . . ." But the court itself -does not always get
together on the meaning of its own terms. At one time it indicates
that the test of a necessary expense is whether the duty is imposed by
the General Assembly,81 and at another time it bluntly states that "There
are many 'corporate duties' which are utterly remote from those relating
to necessary expenses."8 2 The premise on which the majority opinion
relies in Henderson v. Wilmington to prove that wharves and docks
are not necessary expenses is the premise on which the dissenting opin-
ion relies to prove they are necessary expenses. In Palmer v. Haywood
County83 and Sing v. Charlottes 4 the majority opinions start from
premises set forth in one group of court opinions and arrive at the
conclusion that a given expenditure is or is not a necessary expense,
and dissenting opinions starting from premises set forth in another group
of court opinions arrive at an opposing conclusion. The tests are some-
times so broad as to prove all things to all men. What is included in
"those things without which the peace and order of the community, its
moral interests and the protection of its property . . . would seriously
suffer considerable damage"? What is included in: "maintenance of
the public peace", and in "the administration of justice"? What "par-
takes of a governmental nature"? What "purports to be an exercise of
a portion of the State's delegated sovereignty"? In brief, what "involves
a necessary expense"? Reasonable judges as well as reasonable men
may reasonably differ on the meaning of these shibboleths.
80 191 N. C. 269, 279, 132 S. E. 25, 30 (1926).
" Long v. Commissioners, 76 N. C. 273, 278 (1877), cited supra note 5: "The
act prescribing the duties and powers of county commissioners, .... enumerates
among others ... to repair the County buildings .... to raise necessary high-
way moneys, ... to erect bridges, .... to provide by tax for the maintenance
and well ordering of the poor .... to feed prisoners, . . . to pay jurors....
All of these duties are obligatory. The expenses for each and all of them are
of the class of necessary expenses." Commissioners v. Spitzer, 173 N. C. 147,
91 S. E. 707 (1917), cited supra note 70.2 Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 278, 132 S. E. 25, 30 (1926).
83 212 N. C. 284, 45 S. E. 1029 (1937).
84213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271 (1938).
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Changing conditions may operate as a sort of atmospheric agent to
transform a non-necessary into a necessary expense-provided the
court's mind changes with conditions. The court in Fawcett v. Mount
Airy8 5 (overruling a former decision that electric lights and water-
works were not a necessary expense) said, ".... it is not to be expected
in the changed conditions which occur in the lives of progressive people,
that things deemed unnecessary in the government of municipal cor-
porations in one age should be so considered for all future time. In
the effort of the courts to check extravagance and to prevent corruption
in the government of towns and cities, the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment has probably stood by former decisions from too conservative
a standpoint, and thereby obstructed the advance of business ideas
which would be most beneficial if put into operation; and this conserva-
tism of the courts, outgrown by the march of progress, sometimes ap-
pears at a serious disadvantage." And this sentiment was echoed in
Swindell v. Belhaven,8 6 where the court said: electric lights, water-
works and sewerage "might have been so regarded [as luxuries] many
years ago, in their incipiency, but the luxuries of one generation have
become the necessities of another. What would have sufficed for our
ancestors would not begin to meet the needs of the twentieth century.
These things naturally follow in the wake of an advancing civilization."
The court points out many of the changing conditions underlying chang-
ing decisions: problems created by the growth of populous cities; such
as the detection and prevention of vice and crime, the safeguarding of
health and prevention of disease, and the prevention of fire and the
facilitation of communication.81 In Fawcett v. Mount Airy,8 8 the court
said: "The use of water from wells dug in populous communities is
proscribed by the recent progress made in the science of bacteriology,
the practical lessons of that science having been learned by the people
generally.
"It is common knowledge that the most fearful scourges of certain
most dangerous forms of fever arise from the use of water from wells
in towns and cities; and it is out of the power of individuals in towns
and cities to erect and operate appliances for supply of water. As to
the question of lighting the streets and public places, the experience of
all who live in towns and cities of any considerable population is that
without lights upon the streets and in the public buildings both life and
property would be insecure, to say nothing of the almost complete
'5134 N. C. 125, 126, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903).
173 N. C. 1, 4, 91 S. E. 369, 370 (1917).
8 Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 5, 21, 29 S. E. 343, 348 (1898) ; Atkins
v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 303, 186 S. E. 330, 334 (1936) ; Underwood v. Ashe-
boro, 152 N. C. 641, 642, 68 S. E. 147 (1910).88134 N. C. 125, 128, 45 S. E. 1029, 1030 (1903).
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destruction of the conveniences of life and the marring of its 'social
features. The fire department, probably the moat important of the mu-
nicipal department§, would be rendered ineffective, and a considerable
part of the commerce-trade of the country-would be destroyed; for
under our changed conditions a good deal of the traffic between differ-
ent communities and a respectable part of our mail service are con-
ducted at night."
At times it appears that the courts have counted the cost of enter-
prises. This is apparent from the earliest decisions of the court: in
Wilson v. Charlotte, 89 the dissenting opinion argued that the plain
intent and meaning of the Constitutional Convention of 1868 was to
restrict debt and taxes to the utmost, and that the courts were guardians
of that purpose. "Where, then, do we derive our right, as judges, to
say the restriction applies to one purpose more than another, when the
plain terms of the section apply to every purpose? I can well conceive
cases where it would be more necessary to the growth and prosperity
of a county or city to build railroads through or to them than to build
a market-house or a bridge. Under the term 'necessary expenses' there
are many other purposes for which debts may be contracted, as danger-
ous to the taxpayers as the building of railroads. Such a construction only
avoids one evil by flying to another. There is only one way of escape,
and that is by applying the plain prohibition against the contraction of
any debt, for any purpose, except in the way prescribed, to-wit, by
popular vote."
This notion appears again in Mayo v. Commissioners,90 where the
majority opinion declares that electric lights are not a necessary expense:
"Suppose we hold it to be within the corporate power to buy and oper-
ate electric light plants on a pledging of the faith and credit of the
town; how long will it be until it will be claimed that electric street
cars are necessary for the business, progress and convenience of the
town? And, if we grant this claim of necessity, how will we resist
that? What grounds have we to distinguish one from the other? If
we sustain the plea of necessity for street-cars, what is there to prevent
the same claim of necessity to the growth, prosperity and convenience
of the people of a town, to which there is no railroad, from pledging
the faith and credit of the town to build a railroad? Especially so, if
we allow the claim or admission of the corporate authorities to settle
the question of necessity, as is claimed that they should do in this case.
It is heard every day, in towns of much size, that a street railway is
necessary to the growth and prosperity of the town; and, in towns
that have no railroad, to hear it said 'that a railroad to this place is a
necessity.' And it is contended for the defendant in this case that, if
" 74 N. C. 748, 766 (1876). 90 122 N. C. 5, 15, 29 S. E. 343, 346 (1898).
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such town should make a subscription and issue bonds, or should pro-
pose to do so, and wlen suits should be brought to enjoin it from so
doing, if the town alleged it was a necessary expense, it is to be taken
as conclusive evidence that such street car or railroad is one of the
necessary expenses of the municipality, and that the Court is bound by
this claim or admission. If this be so, every town in the State would
soon have railroads running to it, and a line of electric street cars, based
upon the pledged faith and credit of the town. This cannot be the law."
It appears again in Hargrave v. Commissioners,9 1 where a dissent-
ing opinion calling on the court to withdraw public roads from the
classification of necessary expenses, says: "I have come to the conclu-
sion that this Court has gone entirely too far in 'defining what are the
necessary expenses of a county within the meaning of Art. VII, sec. 7,
of the Constitution. At the time when the Constitution of 1868 was
adopted, in which this section first occurs, we had a system of public
roads throughout the State, maintained without special taxation, and
although keeping them up by taxation may result in much better roads,
yet I have no idea that the thought ever occurred to any member of
the Convention of 1868, or to any of the voters of the State, that under
that section it would ever be possible to fasten a debt of $300,000 upon
a county for the purpose of constructing and keeping up its public
roads, without the consent of its citizens.
"I have come to the conclusion that this Court should reverse itself
upon that proposition. No one can tell to what extent this doctrine
may be carried in the future. The proposition here is to issue $300,000
in bonds. What will the limit be? Suppose, instead of $300,000, the
author of the bill had provided for the issue of a million dollars in
bonds: this Court, according to the principles announced, would be
compelled to sustain it, and the groaning taxpayers of Davidson County
would have no remedy. This is inconsistent with all theories of local
self-government and is antagonistic to the best interest of the State."
It appeared again in Keith v. Lockhart,92 where the court said that
the term necessary expense ". . . should not be extended to include an
indebtedness for a line fence around a part of a county which may, at
times, require an extended outlay . . ."; and again, in Ketchie v. Hed-
rick9 3 where the court, in holding that a chamber of commerce was not
a necessary expense nor even a public purpose, says: "If chambers of
commerce, composed of business men and serving the advancement of
the community in financial matters, can be termed governmental simply
because they claim to be advancing the public welfare, from their
"168 N. C. 626, 631, 84 S. E. 1044, 1047 (1915).
02171 N: C. 451, 456, 88 S. E. 640, 642 (1916).
"186 N. C. 392, 394, 119 S. E. 767, 768 (19?3).
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standpoint, and taxation can be levied upon the entire community to
advance the ideas that 'in their discretion' they deem for the public wel-
fare, we know of no reason why the entire public shall not in like
manner be taxed for the benefit of the Rotary clubs, Kiwanis clubs,
and Lions clubs, who, also, as well as the chambers of commerce, are
composed of many of our best citizens, and who in the same manner are
actuated by patriotic motives to advance the public welfare. Then the
ladies have their sororities, the Daughters of the Confederacy, and
many other admirable societies for the public good; and there will be no
reason why there should not also be embraced as subjects for support
by taxation the labor unions, who in their sphere are equally patriotic
and are endeavoring to advance the best interests of the community as
they see it."
It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that this variety of inter-
locking, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting standards for determin-
ing what is and what is not a necessary expense, and the confusion
frequently resulting therefrom, are not the creation of the present court;
they have been advanced by many different judges under many differ-
ent conditions existing in the* nearly three-quarters of a century since
1868. They are among the materials on which judges have to rely in
'deciding cases.
SCHOOLS: NEITHER NECESSARY NOR NON-NECESSARY
Out of the court's efforts to distinguish necessary from non-necessary
expenses within the meaning of Article VII, Section 7, of the North
Carolina Constitution, there has developed a third type of expenditure
which falls in a class by itself : the public schools. If the public library
is not a necessary expense, said the mayor of Wilmington, then the
reform school is an earmark of civilization. He may perhaps be right,
so far as Article VII, Section 7, of the North Carolina Constitution is
concerned, for schools have never been held to be a necessary expense
of a county, city or town, or other municipal corporation within the
meaning of this section. The question was raised within three years
after the Constitution of 1868 was adopted, in the case of Lane v.
Stanly,94 when a township sought to levy taxes for schools, but it was
not considered in the opinion of the court. Twenty years later the ques-
tion was again raised when Goldsboro Township undertook to incur a
debt for schools without the approval of a majority of the township's
qualified voters; and the court held that a township was a municipal
corporation within the meaning of Article VII, Section 7, and that
schools were not a necessary expense of a township.9 5 This conclusion
9'65 N. C. 154 (1871).
" Trustees of Goldsboro Graded School v. Broadhurst, 109 N. C. 228, 13
S. E. 781 (1891).
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was affirmed in Sprague v. Commissioners.90 In Ellis v. Trustees,97
the court extended the scope of its former decision by holding that a
school district was a municipal corporation within the meaning of
Article VII, Section 7, and that schools were not a necessary expense of
a school district. In Rodnmn v. Washington,9 8 the court held that
schools were not a necessary expense of a city or town. Nine years
later in Wharton v. Greensboro,99 the court referred to schools as
"admittedly not a municipal expense". This conclusion was affirmed
in Gastonia v. Citizens National Bank.'0 0 The question was raised in
Barksdale v. Commissioners,'0 ' in which a dissenting opinion called
schools a necessary county expense, but the majority opinion decided
the case on other grounds; and it was raised again seven years later in
Board of Education of Bladen County v. Commissioners,0 2 with the
same result. When the question was next raised in Collie v. Commis-
sionrs,1°3 the leading opinion again decided the case on other grounds,
saying: "Nor are we called upon to hold that the tax to supplement
the school fund in each county . . .may be upheld as a 'necessary
county expense' . . ."; but this time a concurring opinion adopted
the dissenting view expressed twenty-two years earlier calling schools
a necessary county expense. That is the closest the schools ever
came to the favored status, for, the next year, in Hollowell v.
Borden, 04 Justice Brown, writer of the leading opinion in the Collie
case, spoke for a unanimous court: "It has never been held any-
where, so far as we know, that the expense of the public-school sys-
tem of this or any other State is a necessary municipal expense."' 05
He settled the dust raised by the concurring opinion in the Collie
case with the observation: "There is nothing in the recent decision
of the Court in Collie v. Commissioners .. .which sustains the idea
that our public-school system is a necessary municipal expense."'O1
Thus, so far as the public schools are concerned, counties, cities and
towns, and other municipal corporations have had to do without the
advantages accruing to the label of "necessary expense".
It is interesting to note the reasoning of the court. Schools ate a
"necessary expense" within the meaning of Article VII, Section 7, said
the dissenting opinion in the Barksdale case, and elaborated in the dis-
senting opinion in the Bladen County case, because: "Counties must
serve such purposes as the legislature, subject to the Constitution, re-
quires, and expenses incurred in serving these purposes are 'necessary
expense' "; the constitution specifically required that ". . . public schools
" 165 N. C. 603, 81 S. E. 915 (1914). -' 156 N. C. 10, 72 S. E. 2 (1911).
98 122 N. C. 39, 30 S. E. 118 (1898). " 146 N. C. 356, 59 S. E. 1043 (1907).
100 165 N. C. 507, 81 S. E. 755 (1914). 10193 N. C. 472 (1885).
10- 111 N. C 578, 16 S. E. 621 (1892).
103 145 N. C. 170, 173, 59 S. E. 44, 45 (1907).




shall be maintained, at least four months every year . . .", and the
legislature has specifically authorized the counties to levy a tax there-
for; therefore schools are a necessary expense. The court advances
another argument a little harder to handle: the constitution specifically
requires commissioners "... to exercise a general supervision and con-
trol of the penal and charitable institutions, schools, roads and bridges,
levying of taxes and finances of said County as may be prescribed by
law . . .", 'with these duties apparently on an equal footing; the court
has held that penal and charitable institutions are a necessary expense,
that roads and bridges are a necessary expense, and therefore ought to
hold that schools are a necessary expense; the argument for holding
schools to be a necessary expense is even stronger than the argument
holding roads and bridges and penal and charitable institutions to be
necessary expenses, for the constitution specifically says that the com-
missioners are subject to indictment for failing to maintain schools and
not for failing to maintain other functions. 0 7
This second argument being a little too hot to handle, the court
ignored it, and, later, went off on another road that eventually led to
another rendezvous perhaps as good or better.' 0 8 For, said the court,
while schools are not in the category of necessary expenses, they are not
in the category of unnecessary expenses; they stand in a sepaiate cate-
gory of their own; the constitution puts them there-and we can't
help it; therefore the schools are not subject to the limitations of
Article VII, Section 7, and have a preferred status of their own. The
main part of the pressure put on the court to classify schools as a neces-
sary expense was thereby removed. Part of the remaining pressure was
removed as the state, not limited by Article VII, Section 7, increas-
ingly took over the support of the schools, leaving the question to be
raised, if at all, in the case of local supplements.'0 9 Whether the court
111 N. C. CoNsT. art. IX, §3 provides: "Each county of the State shall be
divided into a convenient number of districts, in which one or more public schools
shall be maintained at least six months in every year; and if the commissioners
of any county shall fail to comply with the aforesaid requirements of this section,
they shall be liable to indictment."
100 Collie v. Commissioners, 145 N. C. 170, 59 S. E. 44 (1907).
91 Lacy v. Fidelity Bank of Durham, 183 N. C. 373, 111 S. E. 612 (1922),
in which the state statute, authorizing the state to issue $5,000,000- in bonds, to
set u a special School Building Loan Fund, and to lend money to the various
counties for the purpose of building school buildings required to provide a six-
months school term, and authorizing the counties to issue its bonds and levy a
special tax therefor, without a vote of the qualified voters of the county, was
held to be constitutional and not in violation of Article VII, section 7, of the
constitution. After reviewing several cases construing Article IX of the con-
stitution to be separate and independent of Article VII, Section 7, the court said:
"Applying the principle, the restrictions contained in this Article VII, section 7,
which prohibits counties, cities, and towns, or other municipal corporations, from
contracting debts or levying taxes except for necessary expenses unless approved
by a majority of the qualified votes therein, must be understood to refer to debts
and taxes in furtherance of local measures and do not extend to a state-wide
19401
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
might have ultimately yielded to this pressure belongs to the realm of
speculation.
COURTS AND COMMISSIONERS
What are the relative functions of the court and the local legisla-
tive bodies-county commissioners and city councilmen-in solving the
problem of "necessary expenses"? In Brodnax v. Groom,110 the court
stated the question as follows: "Who is to -decide what are the neces-
sary expenses of a County? The county commissioners; to whom are
confided the trust of regulating all county matters. 'Repairing and
building bridges' is a part of the necessary expenses of a County ...
so the case before us is within the power of the county commissioners.
How can this court undertake to control its exercise? Can we say,
such a bridge does not need repairs; or that in building a new bridge
near the site of an old bridge, it should be erected as heretofore, upon
posts, so as to be cheap, but warranted to last for some years; or that
it is better policy to locate it a mile or so above, where the banks are
good abutments, and to have stone pillars, at a heavier outlay at the
start, but such as will ensure permanence, and be cheaper in the long
run?""'
Six years later, the dissenting opinion in Wilson v. Charlotte112
appears to assume that Brodnax v. Groom gave the sole say to the
commissioners and put no limits to necessary expenses except the com-
missioners' will. But the majority opinion interprets it to mean that
the courts are to decide what are necessary expenses, and the commis-
sioners are to decide whether those types of expenditures classed as
necessary expenses by the court are in fact necessary in a particular time
and place.113 This interpretation has come to be the accepted interpre-
tation of the relative functions of court and commissioners in subse-
quent decisions: as in Vaughn v. Commissioners,"x4 where the court
measure of the instant kind, undertaken in obedience to a separate provision of
the Constitution, and in which the counties are, as stated, expressly recognized
as the governmental units through which the general purpose may be made ef-
fective." Id. at 380, 111 S. E. at 615. Frazier v. Commissioners, 194 N. C. 49,
138 S. E. 433 (1927); Hall v. Commissioners, 194 N. C. 768, 140 S. E. 739
(1927).11064 N. C. 245, 249 (1870).
" In Mitchell v. Trustees of Township No. 8, 71 N. C. 400 (1874), the court
in determining whether. certain expenditures of a township are for "necessary
expenses", seems to leave it almost wholly to the discretion of the governing
body to decide what are the necessary expenses of the township. "At the time
when the taxes complained of were levied," said Justice Reade, "the 'Board of
Trustees had power to lay and collect all taxes which were required to defray
the necessary expenses of the Township'. . . . And having the power, very much-
almost everything-must be left to the discretion of the Board to determine what
were necessaries. It borders on the ridiculous to ask the Courts to say whether$34 for office rent, $20 for a book, $25 for a table, etc., etc., are necessary
expenses."
21274 N. C. 748, 766 (1876). 118Id. at 760.
211117 N. C. 429, 434, 23 S. E. 354, 355 (1895).
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said: "It is within the province of the courts to determine . .. what
classes of expenditures fall within the definition of the necessary ex-
penses of a municipal corporation. But, conceding as we do, that the
cost of erecting court-houses . . . is one of the necessary expenses of a
county, we have no authority... of determining what kind of a court-
house is needed or whdt would be a reasonable limit to the cost . . ..
it is immaterial, in so far as the authority of the courts is affected,
whether the board of commissioners provide for raising the money
needed to erect the court-house by issuing evidences of indebtedness and
realizing on them, so as to pay the cost of building as the work pro-
gresses, or whether they prefer to make a contract to pay in instalments
and incur the risk of creating a floating debt." And, says the court in
Fawcett v. Mount Airy," 5 ". . . except in cases of fraud, the courts
cannot control the -discretion of the commissioners."
But with Mayo v. Commissioners,116 complications are foreshadowed
in a dissenting opinion which says: "While electric lighting might not
have been a necessity years ago, it has become so by general adoption
today, and while it would not be a necessity for a sinller, poorer and
less progressive town, evren today, it may be indispensable for a larger
and wealthier town rapidly increasing in population. . . ." (Italics
supplied.) Here the court appears to be suggesting that it can not only
determine the class of expenditures falling within the meaning of
"necessary expenses", but that it can go further and determine the sort
of unit in which that class of expenditure is necessary. In Storm v.
Wrightsville Beach"17 this differentiating notion is set forth in the
court's opinion holding that "an incinerator for the destruction of gar-
bage in a town, of all things, especially a town on a beach that functions
mostly in the summer, is a necessary expense"; and so of a boardwalk
and jetties. And, in Atkins v. Durham,"18 the notion makes further
headway as the court holds that playgrounds and parks are a necessary
expense for a populous industrial city like Durham. It may be that
these were incidental observations of the court and that no issue was
made of the point on argument. For, in Starmount Co. v. Hamilton
Lakes," 9 where it was directly contended in argument that 81 miles of
water main, 7 1-2 miles of sewer main, and 22 miles of streets were not
necessary expenses for four or five families living on a 1400 acre
farm incorporated as a town, the court directly held that its function
ceased when it had decided what necessary expenses were and that it
' 134 N. C. 125, 129, 45 S. E. 1029, 1030 (1903).
118122 N. C. 5, 26, 29 S. E. 343, 349 (1898).
111189 N. C. 679, 682, 128 S. E. 17 (1925).
"-8 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936) ; cf. Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C.
655. 200 S. E. 416 (1939).119 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E. 909 (1933).
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remained for the town authorities to decide whether they were needed
and that it could not interfere with their discretion except in cases of
fraud.
Thus, the issue is alive and still kicking. In Palmer v. Haywood
County,120 Justice Connor, concurring in the opinion that the hospital
in that case was not a necessary expense, observed ". . . that there
may be a factual situation under which the construction or maintenance
of a hospital for the care and treatment of sick and indigent persons
may be a necessary expense of a town, city or county. . . ." And in
Sing v. Charlotte'2 l Justice Clarkson dissented from the opinion that an
airport was not a necessary municipal expense, on the ground that "an
expense may be a 'necessary expense' for one municipality, but not a
'necessary expense' for another municipality", and that it was a neces-
sary expense for a city the size of Charlotte. Justice Barnhill warned
against this doctrine in his dissenting opinion in Palmer v. Haywood
County, and undertook to bring a county hospital within the class of
necessary expenses on the theory that it was primarily for the use of
"the indigent sick and the afflicted poor" and therefore came within the
class of necessary expenses, perhaps as an extension of the county home
which had been held a necessary expense. The court must make its
choice. If it chooses the original 'doctrine, it may classify governmental
functions and select the function-such as the promotion of health, the
administration of justice-to be called a necessary expense and leave
the rest to the commissioners. If it chooses the latter notion it may
go beyond the classification point and differentiate among localities-a
notion which may be a spur and inducement to a larger town as was
contemplated in Sing v. Charlotte, or a curb and bit when smaller places,
in the opinion of the court, attempt to outrun their own headlights.
The pressure on the court to expand the concept of necessary ex-
penses is as insistent today as ever. The court has overruled itself in
the past, and expanded this concept to include electric lights and water-
works. The court is divided on many questions of necessary expense
which have come before it in recent years. Is it likely that dissenting
opinions will ultimately prevail and expand the limits of "necessary
expenses" to include expenditures now excluded by a majority of the
court: wharves and docks? airports? hospitals? In fact, how does the
court stand on hospitals as a necessary expense? In Armstrong v.
Commissioners,12 2 the court held that a tubercular hospital was not a
necessary expense for the county; in Nash v. Monroe, 23 the court held
that "a hospital for the sick and diseased and others requiring surgical
1.20212 N. C. 284, 288, 193 S. E. 668, 671 (1937).
1-1213 N. C. 60, 76, 195 S. E. 271, 279 (1938).
122 185 N. C. 405, 117 S. E. 388 (1923).
223 198 N. C. 306, 151 S. E. 634 (1930).
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and medical attention" was not a necessary expense for the city; in
Burleson v. Spruce Pine24 and Palmer v. Haywood County 2 5 this
conclusion was reiterated. But in Martin v. Commissioners120 and
Martin v. Raleigh'2 7 the court held that a thirty-year contract with a,
hospital at $10,000 a year to care for the "indigent sick and the afflicted
poor" of Raleigh and Wake County was a necessary city and county
expense. Chief Justice Stacy pointed out in a dissenting opinion that
this decision could not rest on the authority of Commissioners v. Sidney
Spitzer & Co.,' 2 8 for that was limited to the construction of a county
home, and that it could not rest on Article XI, Section 7, of the North
Carolina Constitution, for that limited the obligation to the care of "the
poor, the unfortunate and orphan", while in this case the parties agreed
that the contract would result in "modem hospitalization for the poor of
Wake County and all of its citizens". Has this dissent become the
majority opinion in Palmer v. Haywood County, arising two years later,
when a point was made of the fact that the annex to the county hospital
was "principally", but not exclusively, for the indigent sick and the
afflicted poor? or is the case to be distinguished on the slender ground of
legislative authorization suggested by the court? Has the majority opin-
ion in the Palmer case become the opinion of a unanimous court in
Sessions v. Columbus County, o29 arising one year later? Do the two
Martin cases mean that each of the near to half the counties in the state
covered by the legislative enactment mentioned there can immediately
follow suit? or that the remaining counties may through the device of
added legislation be brought within the limits of necessary expense? If
they may contract for hospital services, as a necessary expense, may not
the time come when building their own hospitals will be considered a
necessary expense? Such were the steps through which water-works sys-
tems became a necessary expense. In applying the doctrine of the
Martin cases, will the court approve a contract for-the medical care of
"indigent sick and the afflicted poor" of all counties which now are or
may be included in authorizing legislative enactments regardless of the
size, population, wealth or other differentiating conditions? or will it
follow the other view and inquire whether under the particular circum-
stances such a contract is a necessary expense?
What of other enterprises, seeking the preferred status whose ques-
tions have already reached the Attorney General's office? What is the
status of expense pertaining to beautifying streets, parking lots, swim-
124 200 N. C. 30, 156 S. E. 241 (1930).
125212 N. C. 284, 193 S. E. 668 (1937).
126208 N. C. 354, 180 S. E. 777 (1935).
127 208 N. C. 369, 180 S. E. 786 (1935).
128 173 N. C. 147, 91 S. E. 707 (1917).
3 20214 N. C. 634, 200 S. E. 418 (1939).
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ming pools, and community houses? Is it a necessary expense to build a
road or street, widen it, grade it, pave it, patch it, and not a necessary ex-
pense to beautify it? Is it a necessary expense to build roads and streets
wide enough for cars to park on near the curbing or on the shoulder
without impeding traffic, and not a necessary expense to purchase land
for parking lots accessible to, but not adjacent to, travelled thorough-
fares? Is it a necessary expense to build parks and playgrounds for out-
door play and recreation and not a necessary expense to build a com-
munity house for indoor play and recreation? And what if the swim-
ming pool, ruled not to be a necessary expense, is included among the
facilities of the outdoor park and playground now held to be a necessary
expense? Which tests or combination of tests to be found in the
opinions of the court are to be controlling in the future? The line,
says the court over and over again, must be drawn somewhere, but
where? After all, what difference has it made in the past, and what
difference does it make now, whether expenditures are classified as
ncessary, as non-necessary, or in the category of the schools? These
questions will be considered in a subsequent article. In the meantime
it may be observed that in these cases the court is concerned with
issues which transcend the "legal formalities" characterized in Hender-
son v. Wilmington, issues which relate to the whole problem of state
and local taxation and finance, and involve the cost and care of public
policy.
(Vol. 18
